xp-forge/cookie-sessions

Cookie-based sessions

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github.com/xp-forge/cookie-sessions

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v0.3.0 2024-03-24 10:26 UTC

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Requires (Dev)

BSD-3-Clause 6ba747a42ff4d9562c7f588f822e29d8c8199a2f

modulexp

This package is auto-updated.

Last update: 2024-12-24 12:01:16 UTC

README

Build status on GitHub XP Framework Module BSD Licence Requires PHP 7.0+ Supports PHP 8.0+ Latest Stable Version

Cookie-based session implementation for the sessions library. Purely client-side, they require no serverside storage and thus scale very well. However, they also come with downsides, discussed below.

Usage

Inside the routing setup:

use web\session\CookieBased;
use web\auth\SessionBased;
use util\Secret;

$secret= new Secret('y+lCLaMzxlnHjkTt3FoPVQ_x5XTHSr78'); // 32 bytes!
$sessions= new CookieBased($secret);

$auth= new SessionBased($flow, $sessions);
return $auth->required(function($req, $res) {
  // Use $req->value('user')
});

A binary-safe 32 byte secret key can be generated using the following:

$ xp -d 'base64_encode(random_bytes(24))'
string(32) "ai4BO6rpwgezJztTalg5rt29XNJwMRMQ"

Security

As stated here:

[The] security risk of putting the session data in the session cookie is the danger of "session replay" attacks. If a valid session cookie is captured from a user's browser (it's visible in the browser's developer console) then that cookie can be copied to another machine and used in a rogue session at any time.

Though the same applies for server-side sessions with session IDs transmitted via cookies, we can destroy the attached session on the server-side to invalidate in these cases, e.g. by deleting the session file or removing the relevant row from the database. For cookie-based sessions, there is no way to remotely guarantee session destruction - and thus no way for a safe user-based "Log me off on all devices" functionality.

However, if we use cookie-based sessions to store short-lived access tokens, we can reduce this risk significantly: A replay can only occur during that window of time. For Microsoft 365, this time is roughly one hour.

👉 Long story short: If there's an easy possibility to use server-side sessions, do that. If dependencies come at a high cost and you have ways of managing the risk, or for development purposes, this implementation can be a valid choice.

Internals

The session data is encrypted in the cookie and then encoded in base64 to use 7 bit only. The first byte controls the algorithm used:

The encrypted value is signed by a hash to detect any bit flipping attacks.

Compression

To prevent hitting the browser cookie limits too early, the cookie values are compressed using LZW (which is relatively easy to implement and gives good savings without requiring an extra PHP extension compiled in) if it's deemed worthwhile. If the cookie value is compressed, the indicators above appear in lowercase (s and o instead of S and O).

An example:

  • JSON value (response from https://api.twitter.com/1.1/account/verify_credentials.json): 2814 bytes
  • Encrypted and encoded cookie value: 3807 bytes (pretty close to the limit!)
  • If compressed, decreases to 2477 bytes (more than a kilobyte saved, 65% of the size)

See also